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Defendant based on the agents acts and representations. 
Plaintiff was awarded a judgment against the Defendant in 
the amount of $11,180.00 for services rendered through 
December 31, 1973, plus costs and interest. The Court found 
that plaintiff was not entitled to recover for advertising 
services for January and February, 1974, in the amount of 
$2,123.20. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent, KUTV, inc., seeks an affirm-
ance of the judgment rendered by the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, Motor Sales, Inc. dba Federal Mobile 
Homes, a Richfield, Utah Company was doing business in Salt Lake 
County, during 19 73 and 1974. Harold Bowen was manager of the 
Salt Lake City lot (R.143). Mr. Bowen contacted Richard Cardwell 
of KUTV, the Plaintiff company, to secure television advertising 
for Motor Sales, Inc., dba Federal Mobile Homes. Bowen placed 
the advertising with Plaintiff commencing in May of 1973 (R.108). 
Advertising industry custom is for salesmen to take 
orders from agents or employees of the client and not to con-
tact company presidents for authorization (R.116,133). The ad-
vertising through August, 1973, was paid for by check signed 
by Dewey Sargent, general manager of the Defendant Company (R.124). 
During June, July and August 1973, Mr. Bowen ordered on behalf of 
the Defendant, over $5,000 of advertising. This advertising was 
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accepted and paid for by the Defendant (R.121). Mr. Bowen 
continued to order advertising for the Defendant in September, 
1973 and thereafter (R.118). There was no indication from 
anyone prior to this lawsuit that the advertising after August, 
1973/ was not authorized by the Defendant Company (R.92,94,95, 
120). All advertising placed by Plaintiff was authorized by 
either Dewey Sargent, Harold Bowen or Jim Martin (R.120,146). 
Prior to running any of the ads, the Plaintiff company 
sent a notice to Defendant in Richfield, Utah, that they had 
ordered advertising and telling them the dates on which it 
would run (R.82). The principals of the Defendant Company in 
Richfield, Utah had advance notice of all advertising furnished 
by Plaintiff but did not instruct Plaintiff not to run it (R.92, 
94,95,12Q0- As late as February, 1975, Plaintiff was assured by 
Defendant's Richfield office that the advertising would be paid 
for, that the checks were on Mr. Sargent's desk, but because he 
was going through a divorce he hadn't signed the checks (R.92,92). 
The Plaintiff Company had a program whereby large volume 
advertisers who purchased a certain amount of advertising would 
receive an expense paid trip. Bowen signed a commitment on be-
half of the Defendant Company to purchase $2600.00 of advertising 
from June through August of 1973 (R.120,121). The Defendant Com-
pany received trips for two to Mazatlan, Mexico, since the De-
fendant spent $5,000 in advertising during that period (R.121). 
-3-
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Bowen later signed another commitment for the Defendant Company 
to purchase $7,000 of advertising from December, 1973, through 
February, 1974, (R.121). For the second commitment the Defend-
ant Company would receive a trip for four to San Juan, Puerto 
Rico, (R.120). No trips on the second commitment were given the 
Defendant Company because of their failure to pay their account 
(R.86,135). 
While the agent of the Defendant signed the commitments 
for the Defendant, the trips were to go to whomever the Defend-
ant Company decided should go (R.130,131). The plaintifffs sales 
manager had the understanding that Mr* Sargent was going to take 
the trip (R.122). Bowen told Sargent of the trip (R.153,170). Mr. 
Sargent stated that he didn't want a trip as he had won ten trips 
(R.153). Bowen testified that Sargent could have taken the trip 
if Sargent chose to do so (R.171). 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO SECRET COMMISSION OFFERED TO ANY AGENT 
OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AND THE PLAINTIFF-RES-
PONDENT DEALT FAIRLY, OPENLY AND IN GOOD FAITH WITH 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, THEREFORE, DEFENDANT-APPEL-
LANT IS OBLIGATED TO PAY FOR THE SERVICES RECEIVED 
FROM PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 
It is an accepted rule of law that a principal will be 
liable to third persons for acts committed by the agent in his 
behalf in the course and within the actual or apparent scope 
of his authority. 3 CJS Section 390, Agency, page 276; B & R 
Supply Company v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 503 P 2d 1215 
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(1972); Naujoks v. Suhrmann, 9 Utah 2d 84, 337 P. 2d 967 (1959). 
The facts of the instant case dictate that the above 
stated rule of law should be applied here* Harold Bowen, man-
ager of Defendant's Salt Lake City operation (R.143)f contacted 
Richard Cardwell of KUTV, the Plaintiff company, for the purpose 
of securing television advertising for the Defendant (R.107) and 
did purchase advertising (R.108). It is advertising industry prac-
tice or custom for salesmen to take orders from agents or employees 
of the client and not to contact company principals for authoriza-
tion of the orders (R.116,133). The advertising ordered by Bowen or 
his successor, Jim Martin (R.120) from May 1973 through August, 19 73, 
amounting to over $5,000 (R.152) was paid for by check signed by 
Dewey Sargent, general manager of the Defendant Company and another 
individual (R.124). Bowen and Martin continued to order advertis-
ing after August 1973, but it was not paid for (R.86) even though 
as late as February, 1975, Defendant's Richfield office assured 
Plaintiff that it would be paid for (R.91,92). 
The Defendant does not challenge the Trial Court's decision 
that the purchases of advertising through December, 1974 were in-
curred by duly authorized agents of the Defendant, upon whom the 
Plaintiff was entitled to rely, but contends only that it should 
not be bound by the contracts because the agents had an individual 
interest and accepted a secret commission to enter into the con-
tracts. (Appellants' Brief p.4). 
The Plaintiff acted fairly, openly and in good faith in its 
dealings with Defendant and did nothing illegal nor against public 
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policy. There is no dispute that the services ordered by Defend-
ant were furnished and were satisfactory. Notice was given to 
Defendant at it's main office in Richfield prior to the running 
of each ad telling them how and when it would run (R.82). Mr. 
Sargent testified that he was aware that they were receiving tele-
vision advertising after August, 1973 (R.151). It was not until 
February, 1974, that Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant 
stating they would only pay bills purchased by purchase order (R. 
93,106). Thus, while the Defendant knew it was receiving advertis-
ing after August, 1973, no attempt was made to cancel the advertis-
ing for five or six months. 
Plaintiff had a sales program in which any client who 
bought certain amounts of advertising would receive free holiday 
trips. Mr. Bowen signed an agreement on behalf of the Defendant 
Company to the effect that if the company purchased $2,600 worth 
of advertising from June through August of 1973, the Defendant 
Company would receive two trips to Mazatlan, Mexico (R.120,121). 
The Defendant purchased and paid for over $5,000 of advertising 
through August, 1973 (R.152) and Mr. Sargent personally authorized 
payment for the advertising (R.124). As a result of that advertis-
ing the Defendant Company received trips for two to Mazatlan, 
Mexico. Bowen told Mr. Sargent he had the trip coming (R.153,170). 
The Plaintiff's sales manager didn!t offer the trip to Bowen but 
to the Company and understood that Sargent wouLd take the trip (R.122). 
Mr. Sargent stated he did not want the trip because he had won ten 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rw,r,-^ t o s t i f i ~ J1 fh t:f S a r g e n t c ou ld !.a^* 
1
 ;•. .• t n e t i . i had he chosen t, ••- s«. . • " Duwen * '.» d 
" ; " 4 l i p r agreeir< * - • ; . -~>mpany vo.*: .^i i 
; ; . } : M P u e r t o R ico : * purc i r .seJ C7?Q0P - - ^ v e r t i s -
. * . . . , . ' , /"i^r M>- • ' ! " * " ' ' . . -. -
: . »
 (, t : : , c c t . l C . t <* . ar;v h a d v ^f- * * 
* s e oy h:.s s i gn ing • u m ^ o ';-•• • > •• < • -* ^~-T . 
i * ' ° - j " : d T T ' r * • r i><ii:y 
tiiC-i WI^UJU l i t : r e c e i v e i ' r t r i p r . ,. v Id st : I - e r ^ i ^ e 
* , m o r t i s . " i*;:rr*h- -<_u ( R . J f * ! 
s p e n t o v e r t ^ u - a*. : , . o n a d v e r t . 5 3 ^ as was 
l e q a x i e o t: . r e c e i v e tl i ; ; ; ,» ^.__, _.*~ „^s a ^ i e i u q u a i * v s 
c o m p e l 
^ t . e i . j u i . i d i y u e s t h a t t h e o f f e r o f t h e t r i p s was a s e c r e t 
b r i b e o f f e r e d by P l a i n t i f f t o Bow en t o i : c 
liJi .i fi-iiipariy ""«. In 'it i ill. iL-i uijLb . The a r g u r ^ i i i.. ; c x i a c i o u t I- • <. 
xr ,i e v i d e n c \ * nm ;.h, / a s any s e c i e t ij r c e n e n t be twrc* *•• 
P l a i n ' - i f f aria Helena. - - . r l u . ; , - . ? 
** - - aaor VT^Q t o , , S a r y e n , * ne g e n e r a l manac< r 
t n e Defendan t o ^ i o 1 * « * . : - ! uhe ddv •' 
c i e n t (R. l : , _; wer^ ^r a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d 
i n an\' way. ^ i c n d d n t r e c e i v e d t h e a d v e r t i s i n g crdc-r^d- ? - r ^ n d -
a n t Was 1 i r r iu^ .v ' t *~i -,, - - , ^ ,•_*_. 
3
 ' montriL , . J u i c , ,-uI . .: ^ n - s i 1973 , t h e 
Ft iuiiciant v o l u n t a r i l y :.. t M 4 ; . i c u as ru^ch. vu adv* ^ i nr| ,,iiiii 
x e q u i i t t a t i r< -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trips were not offered to Defendants agents individually 
but were offered to the company (R.130,131). Mr. Sargent was informed 
of the trip and declined to go (R.153). The commitment signed by 
Bowen indicates that Bowen signed for the Defendant and the agree-
ment lists Defendant's Richfield address. Thus the offer of the 
trips were not secret, were not made to the agents individually, 
were not made to induce the agents to violate their fiduciary duty 
to their principal and did not adversely affect their principals 
interests. 
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's actions violated 
state law (Appellants Brief p.5). Utah does have a bribery statute 
which reads in pertinent part: 
76-6-508. Bribery of or receiving bribe by person in 
the business of selection, appraisal, or criticism of 
goods or services. - (1) A person is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor when, without the consent of the employer 
or principal, contrary to the interests of the employer 
or principal: 
(a) He confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon 
the employee, agent or fiduciary of an employer or 
principal any benefit with the purpose of influencing 
the conduct of the employee, agent, or fiduciary in 
realting to his employer's or principal's affairs; or 
(b) He, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an 
employer or principal, solicits, accepts, or agrees to 
accept any benefit from another upon an agreement or 
understanding that such benefit will influence his con-
duct in relation to his employer's or principals affairs; 
provided that this section does not apply to inducements 
made or accepted solely for the purpose of causing a 
change in employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary. 
There are several elements to this offense. A benefit must 
be offered to an agent. The purpose of the offer must be to influence 
-8-
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will be communicated to the principal. 3 CJS, Agency, Section 432-
433. By analogy, payments to an agent may be presumed to be pro-
perly applied to the principal. Utah Code Annotated Section 22-1-2 
(1953) reads: 
Payments made to fiduciaries - A person who in 
good faith pays or transfers to a fiduciary any 
money or other property which the fiduciary as such 
is authorized to receive, is not responsible for the 
proper application thereof by the fiduciary; and no 
right or title acquired from the fiduciary in consid-
eration of such payment or transfer is invalid in con-
sequence of a misapplication by the fiduciary. 
Plaintiff justifiably presumed that Bowen would communicate 
the offer of the trips to his principals, particularly where prior 
purchases by Bowen had been paid for by the Defendant and where 
Plaintiff was informed that General Manager, Sargent, was going on 
one of the trips (R.122) and where the offer was communicated to his 
principals (R.153,170). 
As stated, Plaintiff did not violate the Utah bribery statute. 
There is no public policy reason Plaintiff should be denied recovery 
in this case. The Defendant has not been injured in any way. The 
services ordered were furnished. Only Plaintiff has been injured to 
the extent that it has not been paid for services rendered in good 
faith. 
The cases cited by Defendant to bolster its position in this 
matter are inapplicable. The Three Utah cases cited involve people 
engaging in the building contracting business without the proper 
license. The public must be protected from unscrupulous and unquali-
fied builders when making such a substantial expenditure as buying a 
-10-
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But, again there is no such kind of conspiracy to profit at the 
expense of some uninformed principal in the present case. 
Finally the case of Sirkin vs. Fourteenth Street Storey 
108 New York Supplement 830 (1908) involved a secret agreement 
between a seller and a purchasing agent, where, in exchange for an 
order to purchase, the purchasing agent would receive 5% of the 
purchase price of the goods ordered. The agreement was secret, 
the secret bribe was given to the purchasing agent for his own 
use and the 5% payment came out of the price paid by the Defend-
ant Company. Moreover, the agreement was in violation of state 
law. None of these characteristics exists in the present case. 
The offer of the trip was not secret, was not given to the agent 
for his own use, was not paid for out of an increased price passed 
on to the Defendant and was not in violation of state law. 
There is no evidence of fraud, conspiracy or collusion 
between Plaintiff and Defendants agents to profit at Defendant's 
expense. But assuming for argument, that there were, Plaintiff, 
nonetheless, under more recent cases would be entitled to recover 
the reasonable value of the services furnished to and enjoyed by 
the Defendant. In the United States Supreme Court case of Crocker 
vs. United States, 240, U.S., 74, 36 S.Ct. 245, 60 L.Ed. 533 (1915), 
a postal employee was offered a share in excess profits by a supplier 
if he could induce the government to purchase satchels. The supplier 
was denied recovery upon the contract for the satchels supplied be-
cause of the fraud but the Court held that this was not an obstacle 
to a recovery upon a quantum valebut. 
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C O N C L D S I O N 
The Plaintiff dealt fairly and openly with the Defendant. 
All services ordered were supplied* There is no dispute as to 
the quality or the price of the services rendered by Plaintiff. 
Defendant was aware that the advertising was ordered and was 
being supplied and that free trips were offered by the Plaintiff. 
Defendant's interests were not adversely affected by the Plain-
tiff. There was no collusion or conspiracy to defraud the De-
fendant. While there is some dispute in the testimony of the 
witnesses, the Trial Court, having heard the testimony and having 
observed the demeanor and comportment of the witnesses, held that 
the Plaintiff should recover for the services rendered. It is 
respectfully submitted that the judgment of the Trial Court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
y 
S' E. "NORDELL WEEKS 
MCMILLAN & BROWNING 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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